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Technical and other information may be a firm’s most important asset. To benefit from its
information, however, a firm has to reveal it to one or more employees. Better informed employees
produce more, but at the same time they demand higher wages to prevent them from joining a
business competitor or starting their own firm. This paper examines the strategic transfer of
information by a firm to its employees over their employment lifes. Generally, the firm is shown to
transfer additional information to its employees each period of the employment relationship, while
wages rise accordingly. An implication of the model is that more senior workers are more
productive and receive higher wages because they have better access to the firm’s vital informati-
on.
* I thank Theodore Palivos for useful comments.1. Introduction
A firm’s most important asset may be its technical and other information. To benefit from its
information, the firm has to reveal it to one or more employees. Informed employees, however,
may leave the firm to use any received information to their own advantage. Research personnel at
high-tech firms, for instance, may decide to join a competing firm or to start their own firm. Also,
employees in law and consulting firms may quit while taking along key clients. In practice, firms
attempt to prevent quitters from exploiting the firm’s information by means of contracts that, say,
prevent employees from joining a competitor for some time. Business conventions may also restrict
firms’ ’raiding’ of a competing firm to hire away key personnel knowledgeable of its business
secrets. Explicit contracts and implicit business conventions in practice, however, imperfectly
protect firms’ informational property rights. This paper examines the strategic intrafirm flow of
information to employees in a world of incomplete informational property rights. A key result is
that the firm generally reveals information gradually to its workers. The model can explain that
labor productivity and wage income increase with seniority. Several other labor market phenomena,
such as large payments by workers to the firm at key career stages (for instance, at the time of
election to partnership in an accounting firm) and some firms’ preference for hiring senior
managers several years before their ultimate retirement, are also explained.
The firm’s main problem is to decide when to reveal what information to its employees.
Following the transfer of information, the firm and the worker bargain over the wage in a Nash
fashion. A well-informed worker has better outside options in case of imperfect informational
property rights, and hence will bargain for a higher wage. By withholding useful information from
the worker, the firm thus can reduce the wage demand. For the firm, withholding information early
in the worker’s career is relatively advantageous, as then the present value of the worker’s outside
labor income is relatively sensitive to information received from the firm. Useful information is
withheld from the worker, even though its revelation is entirely costless. Over time, however, the
firm transfers additional information to the worker and consequently productivity and the wage
increase. Senior workers are in fact more productive than junior workers, as they have better access
to the firm’s vital information. A worker’s net contribution to the firm, defined as productivity
1minus the wage, may either increase or decrease with age. This explains some firms’ preference for
hiring relatively senior workers that of necessity have a relatively short employment horizon. In the
information age, a firm’s worth more and more reflects its proprietary information rather than its
physical capital. Intrafirm information tranfers as an explanation of labor productivity and wages
thus are increasingly relevant.
A key model parameter is the share of firm information that an employee can appropriate
upon leaving the firm. This parameter reflects, among other things, the nature of the firm’s
information, the enforceability of contracts, the industry market structure and generally labor
market practices and conventions. As nations differ in these respects, they can also be expected to
differ in the appropriability of firm information by employees. Japanese firms, for instance, appear
to have been relatively unwilling to hire workers in mid-career, and generally Japanese workers
have longer employment tenures than American workers (see Hashimoto and Raisian, 1985).
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With relatively little interfirm labor mobility, Japanese workers may be more likely to remain with
their employer after receiving important information than their U.S. counterparts. Especially in the
U.S. high-tech sector, there is a tradition of ex-employees of established firms to start their own
businesses. Such new enterpreneurs no doubt aim to appropriate some technical information
acquired at their previous employment. Cross-country differences in the enforcement of firm
informational property rights may be important in explaining the level ofR&D ,international
competitiveness, and long term economic growth. At one extreme, the present theoretical model
can explain that with incomplete informational property rights, additional knowledge adds no value
to the firm, as this information, once acquired by the firm, will be withheld form employees
anyway. In this instance, the firm clearly faces no incentive to engage in information-enhancing
activities.
Increasing productivity and upward sloping wage profiles can, of course, be explained by
investments in specific human capital (see, for instance, Becker (1962), Oi (1962), Hashimoto
(1981), Carmichael (1983)). The analysis of the present paper, however, is entirely different. First,
information transmission is assumed to be completely costless and, second, productivity and wages
slope upward precisely because information is not firm-specific but rather is also useful outside the
2firm. Lazear (1979, 1981) and others, as surveyed by Carmichael (1989), explain an upward
sloping wage schedule in models of imperfect and costly monitoring of work effort by firms. The
present paper differs from the contributions by Lazear (1981, 1981) in that it precisely pins down
the shape of the wage schedule. Also, the present model explains increasing labor productivity, and
not only an upward sloping wage schedule. Several other explanations of increasing wage
schedules exist in the literature. Freeman (1977) and Harris and Holmstrom (1982), for instance,
focus on the role of wage income insurance, while Salop and Salop (1976) and Nickell (1976)
provide adverse selection models where workers sort themselves by choosing between differently
sloped wage schedules. Other related work is by Grout (1984) and Van der Ploeg (1987) who
examine how a firm’s investment in physical capital is affected by subsequent wage setting. Again,
a major difference is that investments in physical capital is costly, while the transmission of
already existing information is in principle costless. This explains why in the present paper the
information flow within the firm is independent of firm and worker wage bargaining strength,
while in Grout (1984) investment in physical capital generally is related negatively to the union’s
bargaining power.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 sets out the basic model. In
section 3, the firm can freely determine how much information to transfer to the worker each
period. The resulting information sequence and the wage schedule are determined. Also, the
optimal length of the employment horizon from the firm’s and the worker’s perspectives is
analyzed. Finally, the section presents some comparative statics results regarding the (1) the
parameter of firm and worker wage bargaining strength, (2) the parameter that indicates to what
extent a worker can appropriate the firm’s information, and (3) the firm’s exogenously given
information stock. Alternatively, it is interesting to analyze the case where the firm at any moment
can precommit itself to transfer a certain information volume to the worker at a future point in
time. As shown in section 4, such a commitment can solve the problem of the underprovision of
information by the firm to the worker, at least after the initial employment period. Section 5
concludes.
32. The model
A single firm has a certain information stock, , that is exogenously given. For the informati- k
on to be useful, it has to be revealed to an employee. Let us assume for simplicity that at each
moment the firm employs at most a single worker.
2 Each worker retires n periods after first
entering the labor market.
3 The firm knows the worker’s age, and thus can choose the maximum
employment horizon of a new hire with the firm. Each period of the employment relationship, the
firm chooses how much information the worker has access to. Let kt denote the worker’s informati-
on at time t. Any information transfer by the firm to the worker is irreversible. Also, the worker
can receive no more than the firm’s maximum information, . Formally, these restrictions on the k
information sequence, kt, are stated as follows,
(1.1) kt £ k
kt+1³k t (1.2)
A better informed worker is more productive. Specifically, let the worker’s and (thus the
firm’s) output be given by g(kt), with g(0) = 0, (kt)>0 , , ( k t )<0at time t.
4 g g (0) ¥ g
The wage at time t is denoted wt, while there is a constant interest rate r.
At any moment, the worker is free to quit the firm. A renegade worker can appropriate a share
s of the firm’s information revealed to him to that point. The appropriation parameter, s, reflects
to what extent the firm can protect its informational property rights. With s =0( s=1) , the
firm’s property rights are fully (not at all) protected. The technology embodied in the g() function
is assumed to be common knowledge. After quitting at time t, the worker thus can produce an
output g(skt) for the remainder of this work life with information acquired at his earlier employ-
ment.
5 At all times, the worker can also earn an outside wage, , in an alternative, no-information w
sector. After quitting the firm, a worker thus earns a constant labor income equal tomax ( g(s kt), w)
until retirement. A worker is assumed to be unable to pass on any information acquired at the firm
to other workers at any time.
4As shown below, a worker’s employment horizon with the firm importantly influences how
much information the worker is privy to, his labor productivity, and ultimately the profitability of
the employment relationship to the firm. Below, we first analyze an employment relationship of
given length, before turning to the question of the optimal employment duration for the firm. For
now, the firm hires a worker at time 0 who retires n periods later. Each period of the employment
span, the firm (unilaterally) sets how much information the worker receives, after which the firm
and the worker bargain over the wage. To be precise, the order of events each period is as follows:
(1) the firm transfers knowledge, kt, to the worker, (2) the firm and the worker bargain over the
wage, wt, (3) the employee works and receives the wage, wt. In the benchmark model, there is
assumed to be no commitment by either party: there are no commitments regarding the information
variable, the wage or the worker’s employment decision.
6 This is the case discussed in section 3.
Alternatively, we assume that the firm can precommit to a certain information transfer path over
the employee’s work life, as analyzed in section 4. In both models, the firm and worker bargain
each period in Nash fashion over the information rents accruing to the firm-worker combination for
the remainder of the employment horizon. The firm and the worker thus engage in a sequence of
Nash bargains where in each period they anticipate all future bargains. This sequence of Nash
bargains in the end determines the sequence of period-specific wages, wt.
Let Qt be the present value as of time t of firm output, g(kt), over the remainder of the
employment horizon till period n. Similarly, let Wt be the present value of wages, wt, as of time t













Further, let Vt = Qt - Wt be the present value of firm profits from time t to time n. Next, let
be the present value of labor income of a worker who quits the firm at time t given by, ˆ Wt














and where jt is defined to be the present value as of time t of a unit annuity stream from time t to
time n. In the Nash bargaining, is the worker’s threat labor income payoff. For simplicity, the ˆ Wt
firm’s threat profits payoff is assumed to be zero if the worker quits.
7 The firm and worker have
bargaining strengths parameterized by a and 1-arespectively, where we assume that 0<a 1. £
At time t, the firm and the worker perfectly anticipate the information sequence, kt, till time n.
Given this insight, the generalized Nash bargaining solution implies the maximization with respect
to Wt at time t of the index, Nt, given by,
(2) Nt (Qt Wt)
a(Wt ˆ Wt)
1 a
Let us assume that to ensure that the firm-worker combination can operate with g(k) > w
positive information rents, as then Qt > with . After maximizing Nt in (2) with respect to ˆ Wt kt k
Wt, we can solve for Wt as follows,
(3) Wt a ˆ Wt (1 a)Qt
In (3), the actual labor compensation, Wt, in present value terms is a weighted average of the
worker’s best alternative labor compensation, , with a weight a and the firm’s output, Qt with a ˆ Wt
weight 1-a .With a =1 , equation (3) simply reduces to so that in each period the firm Wt ˆ Wt
offers its worker a prospective labor compensation of a present value equal to the worker’s best
alternative. Knowing (3), the firm sets the information variable,kt, each period. Withg(k) > w ³ g(sk),
it is interesting to note that the firm always tranfers all its information, , to the worker in the k
6initial employment period. To see why, note that with , we have for any kt. w ³ g(sk) ˆ Wt j tw
Then we have Vt = Qt - Wt = using (3), which clearly increases in kt. In the a(Qt jtw)
remainder, we will assume that . In this instance, the firm’s information transfer w<g ( s k)
decision is non-trivial, and generally depends on whether the firm in fact can precommit to an
information sequence. Note that with we always have , as it is w<g ( s k) ˆ Wt jtg(skt) ³ jtw
always in the firm’s interest to transfer information to the worker at least to the point where
so that a departing worker is at least indifferent about working with information g(skt) w
acquired at the firm.
8
Next, we can use the information rents sharing rule in (3) to solve for the wage sequence, wt.
Starting with period n, expression (3) immediately yields that wn equalsa g(skn) (1 a)g(k n).
Working backwards, we now can use (3) to solve for the wage wn-1in period n-1using the
earlier solution for wn. This way, we can solve for the entire wage sequence, wt, as follows,












g(skt) g(skt 1) (1 a)g(k t)
(4.2) wn a g(skn) (1 a)g(k n)
Inspection of (4.1) shows that the wage, wt, at time t only depends on the information
variables kt and kt+1rather than on the entire information sequence. The wage, wt, in (4.1) in
particular is related positively to the current information variable, kt, but negatively to next period’s
information variable, kt+1 . The worker is willing to accept a lower current wage, wt, in anticipation
of a higher anticipated information variable, kt+1 , next period, because a higher future information
variable heralds higher future wages. Using (3), (4.1)-(4.2) and the definitions of Qt, Vt, Wt, and
, we can express firm profits, Vt, at time t over the remaining employment horizon in terms of ˆ Wt















7The firm’s problem, as analyzed below, is to choose the information sequence, kt,s oa st o
maximize profits, Vt, in (5) given an earlier determined employment horizon n.
3. Single period information commitments
In this section, the firm is assumed to be entirely free to set the information variable each
period (subject, of course, to (1.1) and (1.2)). In other words, the firm cannot commit to an
information transfer to the worker to take place in any future period. First, the section considers
the resulting optimal information sequence from the firm’s perspective, and its implications for the
wage schedule for a given employment horizon. Next, the section considers the firm’s preferences
regarding the length of the employment relationship. Finally, the section presents some comparati-
ve statics results regarding (1) the bargaining parameter, a, (2) the appropriation parameter, s, and
(3) the firm’s information stock, . k
3.1 The information sequence and the wage schedule
With only single period information commitments, the information sequence, kt, can be found
by backward induction. First, the firm chooses kn in period n so as to maximize period-n profits,
Vn, given the expression for wn in (4.2). Next, the firm selects kt-1in period n-1to maximize
given the expression for wt-1in (4.1) and given kn and wn, and so on. More formally, the Vn 1
firm chooses kt in period t so as to maximize Vt in (5) taking into account constraints (1.1) and
(1.2) and the rents sharing rule (3), which as discussed before implies that . In g(skt) ³ w
practice, only the latter constraint and the maximum information constraint in (1.1) will ever
restrict the information sequence. Thus we can distinguish three cases regarding the firm’s optimal
choice of kt as follows:
case i) (constaint (1.1) binding):
If (k) - jt s 0, then . g g (s k) > kt k
8case ii) (neither constraint strictly binding):
If (k) - jt s (sk) 0, then kt = with () - j t s ( s)=0if g g £ k g k g k g(sk ) ³ w
case iii) (the constraint g(s ) binding): kt ³ w
If g(s )<wwith defined under ii), then kt = with g(s )=w . k k k k
In cases ii) and iii), the firm in fact withholds useful information from the worker at time t,
even though the transfer of additional information is entirely costless. If either case ii) or case iii)
applies for t=n ,then the firm withholds information even in the last period of the employment
relation. In essence, information is withheld if additional information increases the worker’s current
productivity, g(kt), less than the prospective wage bill, Wt. Next, note that if case ii) applies for a
period t<n , then the information sequence is increasing, i.e. kt+1>k t . Formally, this follows from
the fact that declines with t and from a second order condition for a maximum. This immediate- jt
ly implies that the irreversibility constraint on information transfers in (1.2) is in fact satisfied. The
upward slope of the information sequence implies that it is relatively advantageous for the firm to
withhold information from the worker early in the employment relationship. The reason is that
withholding information from a relatively junior worker has a relatively large impact on (the
present value of his) outside labor income option, as a junior worker who quits the firm faces a
relatively long period of work outside the firm until ultimate retirement. As time proceeds, a
worker’s outside labor income becomes less sensitive to the inside information (as jt declines with
t), and thus the firm transfers additional information to the worker. Finally, it is interesting to note
that the information sequence, kt, is independent of the bargaining parameter, a. In contrast, Grout
(1984) finds that a firm’s physical capital investment is generally negatively related to a union’s
bargaining strength in a subsequent wage bargaining round. The difference in results follows from
the fact that in Grout (1984) the cost of investment is borne entirely by the firm, while in the
present model the tranfer of information by the firm is costless.
Next, let us consider the wage schedule. First, note from (4.1)-(4.2) that the wage, wn,i n
period n can be no less that any previous wage, as the information sequence, kt, is non-declining.
9
9Otherwise, a variety of wage schedules are possible: the wage schedule can be strictly increasing in
all periods, it can be partly or entirely flat, and it can even decline for one or several periods. To
illustrate, we can consider two possible extreme information sequences. First, with (k) - j0 s g
(sk) 0 the firm at no point restricts the worker’s access to information (i.e. kt =kfor all t), g ³
as doing so does not even pay in period 0. In this instance, the wage profile is entirely flat at wt =
.
10 Second, with (k) - s (sk )<0the firm withholds some a g(sk) (1 a)g(k) g g
information from the worker each period, as doing so pays even in the last period n. In this
instance, the information sequence is increasing throughout, i.e. k0 <k 1< ··· < kn, if the firm in
the initial period chooses , which clearly is the case if w=0 . Next, let us consider g(sk0)>w
the possibility that the wage schedule declines for one or more periods. To start, we can use (4.1)
to express the wage increase, wt+1-w t, in period t+1as follows,









jt [g(skt 1) g(skt)]
jt 2
1 r
[g(skt 2) g(skt 1)]
t = 0,...,n-1 (6) (1 a)(g(k t 1) g(kt))
First, from (6) we see that the wage never decline if a tends to 0, as in this case the wage, wt,
in each period equals the non-declining output, g(kt). In contrast, a set of sufficient conditions for
the wage to fall in period t+1 , i.e. for wt+1<w t , are (1) kt+2> , (2) kt+1=k t , and (3) a > kt 1
0. The first two conditions are, for example, met if the information sequence is initially flat for two
periods (at with as in case iii), and then rises. The wage then drops in the last k g(sk ) w
period the information sequence is flat. The temporary wage drop in this and other cases occurs in
anticipation of future information transfers to the worker and thus higher future wages.
11 In actual
labor markets, workers in knowledge-intensive firms, such as accounting or other professional
service organizations, sometimes pay large sums of money to the organization at the time they are
elevated to the rank of partner. At these times, workers no doubt gain considerably better access to
the firm’s vital business information. Intrafirm information transfers thus may in part explain such
payments by workers to the firm. To conclude, note that the wage schedule may or may not imply
10positive information rents for the worker and thus job rationing. To be precise, there is job
rationing at time 0 with unless a =1and as in case iii). In summary, the W0 > j0 w k k
results concerning the information sequence and the wage schedule are as follows,
Proposition 1: With single period information commitments, the firm generally transfers additional
information to the worker each period. The wage schedule can rise, be constant or drop over time,
even though the final wage can be no less than any previous wage.
3.2 The employment duration
As the firm in principle has an infinite horizon, it will replace its single worker upon
retirement. In this scenario, the firm can choose the length of the employment duration of a
succession of workers. In this subsection, we consider the firm’s choice as to the employment
duration of each of its successive workers. The firm chooses the employment length so as to
maximize firm value, or equivalently the perpetuity equivalent profit stream. We can without loss
of generality assume that a =1 ,as a enters the expression for Vt in (5) as a multiplicative factor.
The main insight is that the employment duration is generally more than a single period, but less
than the worker’s entire work life. To be precise, first note that the firm wishes an employment
length exceeding a single period if k0 <k 1in the two period case. To see this, note that the fact
that k0 is less than k1 indicates a revealed preference on the part of the firm as the outcome with k0
= k1 is possible. Next, we can see that the employment length is generally less than the entire
employment life by taking the example of a maximum three period horizon. In this instance, the
firm prefers a two-period employment relationship to the maximum three periods if optimally k0 =
k1 <k 2in the three period case, because going from two to three periods in this case reduces
annuity equivalent output, while the annuity equivalent wage is the same (remember that with a =
1 the present value of wage compensation and thus the annuity equivalent wage only depend on
the initial information transfer, k0, to the worker).
12 In the three period model, we can have k0 = k1
<k 2if optimally k0 = k1 = with . With three periods, this information sequence k g(sk ) w
obtains if the appropriation parameter, s, is unity. To illustrate this, Table 1 gives the values of the
11information sequence, kt, the wage path, wt, and profits, g(kt)-w t , in the model with s =1 ,a=1
and a generally n-period horizon. All three variables are constant for the periods t = 0,...,n - 2.I n
the table, we see that kn-2= <k nso that wn-1<w n . From the table, we see that the firm kn 1
achieves highest firm value value with a succession of two period employment relationships. It is
interesting to note that the absence of any informational property rights, i.e. s =1 , does not
prevent the firm from having a positive value if the employment relationship exceeds a single
period. In practice, firms frequently appear to limit the maximum employment duration of its
workers, and especially of senior managers, by hiring them several years before their ultimate
retirement. Managers in fact appear to be quite mobile between firms in the last stages of their
careers. The present model provides a strategic reason for firms to offer workers less than life time
employment contracts.
3.3 Comparative statics results
This subsection presents some comparative statics results concerning (1) the bargaining
parameter, a, (2) the appropriation parameter, s, and (3) the firm’s information stock, . As k
indicated before, the bargaining parameter, a, has no influence on the information sequence, kt.
Rather, the parameter a affects the sharing of the information rents between the firm and the
worker. Specifically, (3) and (5) imply that , while from dVt/da dWt/da Q t ˆ W t >0
(4.1)-(4.2) we get that if s <1 . Next, a small change in the appropriation parameter, dwt/da <0
s , does not affect the information variable, kt,i fk t=k(as in case i). Using (4.2), we immediately
see that in this instance the wage, wt, rises with s,a s i fs<1 . Profits dwt/ds akg (sk) > 0









12s kt g (s kt)
g (s kt)
>0
and where as a second order condition. In (7), the sign of dkt/ds is g (kt) jts
2g (skt)<0
ambiguous, as dkt/ds <0if <1 , and vice versa. In this instance, firm profits are affected
ambiguously by a change in s as dVt/ds aj tk tg (sk t)dk t/ds a
n
i t 1g (ki)/
, while the impact on the present value of wages is also ambiguous as (1 r)
i tdki /ds < >0
dWt/ds . [ aj tk tg (sk t) g (kt)]dkt/ds (1 a)
n
i t 1g (ki)/(1 r)
i tdki /ds < >0
A larger appropriation parameter, s, thus paradoxically may be to the detriment of the worker.
Finally with kt = (as in case iii), we have dkt/ds =- / s<0rather than (7).
13 k k
To conclude this subsection, we consider an exogenous change in the firm’s overall informati-
on stock, k. First, such a change is immaterial for all parties, if the information stock, , at no k
point restricts the information sequence, i.e. if kn <k . In this instance, additional information is of
no value to the firm-worker combination, and there clearly is no incentive on the part of the firm
to undertake any information-enhancing activities, for instance, in the form of R & D. Alternative-
ly, consider that the information stock, k, constrains the information sequence for the last n-j+1
(but not the initial) period, i.e. kt =kfor t ³ j > 0. Now we have dkt/dk = 1 for t ³ j. In this
instance, both the firm and the worker generally gain, as dVo/dk = ajj (k)/(1 + r)
j >0and g
if a <1 . The wage, wt, initially remains flat for t £ j dW0/dk (1 a) jjg (k)/(1 r)
j >0
-2 ; it then drops in period t=j-1 ,a sdwj-1 /dk = - aj js ( s k ) / ( 1+r )<0 ; finally, it rises g
permanently, as dwt/dk = as (sk )+( 1-a )( k ) > 0 for t = j,.., n. Next, with ko =k ,w e g g
have dkt/dk = 1 for all t so that firm value increases, as dVo/dk = aj o[( k ) - s( s k) ] > 0 g g
, while the worker also gains, as dWo/dk = jo [ as +( 1-a )( k ) ] > 0 and dwt/dk = g (s k) g
as ( s k) + (1 - a)( k ) for all t. If the firm’s information stock is binding in any period, then g g
the worker gains in all cases from a larger overall information stock if a <1 . The fact that the
worker can appropriate at least some of the gains of an enlargement of the firm’s overall
information stock provides a disincentive for the firm to engage inR&Dactivities.
134. Multiperiod information commitments
In this section, we assume that the firm can credibly commit at time 0 to an information
sequence, kt, over the entire employment duration. An ability to commit on the part of the firm
tends to lead to a quicker information transfer to the worker. To see this, remember from (4.1) that
the wage, wt, at time t is negatively related to the information variable, , at time t+1 .A n k t 1
information transfer at time t+1thus has the benefit to the firm of reducing the earlier wage at
time t. Absent multiperiod commitments, however, the firm takes this period’s wage payment as
given when setting next period’s information variable. An absence of multiperiod informational
commitments then contributes to an underprovision of information by the firm to its employee.
This section starts with an analysis of the information sequence and the wage schedule with
multiperiod information commitments. Second, the role of the employment duration in this instance
is considered. Finally, the section presents some comparative statics results.
4.1 The information sequence and the wage schedule
With a multiperiod information commitment, the firm chooses the entire information sequence,
kt, at time 0 so as to maximize firm profits, Vo, in (5). Inspection of (5) immediately reveals that in
this instance the firm sets kt =kfor all t>0 ,which also implies that the irreversibility constraint
(1.2) is met. To illustrate, without loss of generality we can consider the special case of exclusive
firm bargaining power with a =1 . The wage bill, W0, as of time 0 then only depends on the initial
information transfer, k0. As output g(kt) increases in kt, it immediately follows that the firm should
set kt =kfor t>0 . Next, the determination of the optimal value of k0 is exactly analogous to the














[g(sko) g(sk)] (1 a)g(k 0)
w t =ag(sk )+( 1-a )g ( k ) t>0 (8.2)
14The worker accepts a relatively low initial wage, w0, if in anticipation of an additional k0 < k
information transfer in period 1.
14 Otherwise, the wage schedule is entirely flat at ag(sk )+( 1-
a )g(k). These results are summarized as follows,
Proposition 2: With multiperiod information commitments, the firm withholds no information from
its worker except possibly in the initial period. The wage is constant unless the firm withholds
some information in the initial period, in which case the initial wage is less than the subsequently
constant wage.
4.2 The employment duration
Next, we consider the firm’s choice of the employment duration. Again, without loss of
generality we can assume that a = 1. The main insight is that the firm chooses the longest possible
employment duration. To see this, consider first that k0 =kfor a particular employment duration.
Then a lengthening of the employment duration by a single period does not affect per period
profits if again k0 =kis optimal for the firm. A further lengthening, which increases j0, at some
point causes the firm to be interested in choosing k0 < k. At that point, lengthening the employ-
ment duration has increased annuity equivalent profits, as the fact that the firm sets k0 < k
indicates a revealed preference. With k0 < k, we can consider an even further lengthening of the
employment duration. Such a lengthening further increases annuity equivalent profits. To see why,
again consider an increase in the employment duration by a single period. If the firms does not
then adjust k0, it still is the case that the firm gains as in the additional period the firm achieves a
relatively high output of , while the present value of wages, W0, only depends on the (by g(sk)
assumption unchanged) k0. Next, note that the firm in fact optimally chooses a lower value of k0
(unless already ), which by itself increases firm value as it indicates a revealed g(sk0) w
preference. So regardless of whether k0 is in fact lowered, firm value increases with the employ-
ment duration if k0 < k. With a =1 , as indicated before W0 only depends on k0. The annuity
equivalent wage thus drops with the employment length, if k0 declines.
154.3 Comparative statics results
To start, the bargaining parameter, a, as before does not affect the information sequence, kt,
but a larger value of a rather shifts part of the information rents towards the firm. To be precise,
(8.1) and (8.2) imply that a higher value of the bargaining parameter, a, reduces the wage, wt,i n
all periods t if s <1 . Consequently, firm profits, Vt, increase in all periods, while labor compensa-
tion, Wt, declines. Next, the appropriation parameter, s, can only affect the information variable, k0,
in period 0 if k0 < k. Specifically, k0 may increase or decrease with s, as is evident from (7) for t
=0 . Only the wage, w0, in period 0 is potentially affected: if (7) applies as in case (ii) thendw0/ds dW0/ds
while consequently [aj0k0g (sk0) g (k0)]dk0/ds < > 0, dV0/ds j 0ak 0g (sk 0)dk 0/ds
To conclude, an increase in the firm’s information stock, , increases kt one-for-one in all < > 0. k
periods t = 1,...,n, and possibly also in period 0 if . An analysis of how affects the k0 k k
variables wt, Wt and Vt is analogous to section 3.3 and omitted.
5. Conclusion
Technical know-how and other business secrets may be a firm’s most important asset,
especially in the high-tech and service industries. For information-intensive firms, the management
of this information may be one of their most crucial tasks. This paper examines the flow of
information within the firm to its employees. The firm is generally shown to transfer additional
information to its employees over their employment lifes. Consequently, the wage schedule is
generally upward sloping. The model, however, can also explain a temporary wage reduction that
serves as a payment on the part of the worker for an anticipated future information transfer from
the employer. Further, the model explains that employers may have a preference for hiring senior
workers with relatively short employment horizons. Both phenomena can indeed be observed in
information-intensive segments of the labor market, and they are not explained by, for instance, the
firm-specific human capital theory. The importance of proprietary information clearly differs
between firms, sectors and nations. A careful empirical analysis can perhaps shed more light on the
significance of imperfect informational property rights for actual labor market experience.
15
This paper has focused exclusively on the transfer of information between a firm and its
16employees. The model, however, can equally be applied to the transfer of information between
other business partners. It is, for instance, possible to examine the strategic transfer of technology
by a multinational firm to a foreign subsidiary that pays taxes in the foreign country. Analogously
to the present paper, the multinational firm can then be shown to withhold some technology in
early periods so as to reduce the subsidiary’s local tax bill, even if technology transfer to the
subsidiary itself is costless. Over time, the technology transferred as well as the local tax payments
may increase. A schedule of increasing tax payments amounts to a tax holiday in the early periods.
It may similarly be interesting to examine the optimal dynamic technology transfer between
unrelated business entities and the corresponding sequence of interfirm licence payments.
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1. See Clark (1979, p. 165) for a case study of interfirm labor mobility in Japan.
2. Alternatively, the firm can be assumed to be able to employ different workers of different
ages at a single point of time. This complication is omitted.
3. The employee is assumed to be potentially equally productive in all years before retirement,
while he can no longer work after retirement. In this setting, the issue of whether mandatory
retirement is desirable does not arise.
4. The model can easily be extended to include other variable factors of production.
5. The assumption that the firm and the worker apply the same production function g() can be
relaxed.
6. The firm, however, cannot replace a worker who quits before retirement, perhaps because the
worker takes along all the firm’s crucial clients.
7. A possible reason is that a departing worker takes along all the firm’s key clients.
8. To see this, note that with , we have . Then we have Vt = Qt - Wt = g(skt)<w ˆ W t j tw
using (3), which increases in kt. a(Qt jtw)
9. Hashimoto and Raisian (1985, 1992) find that wage profiles of both American and Japanese
workers generally peak some time before retirement. This evidence, however, is for overall
employment, and not for the relatively select group of information-intensive workers in, for
instance, management and research positions or in particularly information-intensive sectors.
10. More generally, the firm withholds no information from the worker during one or several pe-
riods at the end of the worker’s career. Specifically if (k) - jm s (sk) 0, then the g g ³
firm withholds no information from the worker in the final n-m+1periods, and the wage
schedule is flat at wt = during these last n-m +1periods. a g(sk) (1 a)g(k)
11. With a =1 , equation (3) implies that the present value of labor compensation, Wt, as of time t
only depends on the current information variable, kt. In this extreme case, the current wage, w t ,
thus falls one-for-one with any anticipated future labor income increase following kt+1>k t .
12. It follows that a necessary (but not sufficient) condition for annuity equivalent profits to be
higher in the three period case than in the two period case is k0 <k 1<k 2.
13. In this instance, the term has to be added to (substracted a [g (kt) jtsg (skt)]dkt/ds
from) the above expression for dVt/ds (dWt/ds).
14. The initial wage, w0, in (8.1) can in principle be negative, if k0 is substantially less than k and
if the worker faces no borrowing constraint. A borrowing constraint, however, effectively
21restricts the initial wage payment, w0, to be non-negative. A binding initial borrowing
constraint on the part of the worker induces the firm to transfer more information in the initial
period than it would otherwise transfer. A binding borrowing constraint thus increases the
present value of labor compensation.
15. The positive firm-size effect on wages, for instance, perhaps can in part be explained by a
relatively large stock of knowledge of big firms.
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